I Introduction
The question of this paper is, what would it be to act with freedom of the will? What kind of control is inchoately in view when we speak, pretheoretically, of being 'selfdetermining' beings, of 'freely making choices in view of consciously considered reasons' (pro and con) -of its being 'up to us' how we shall act? My question here is not whether we have (or have any reason to think we have) such freedom, or what is the most robust account of our freedom compatible with late twentieth-century science. Many contemporary philosophers are all too ready to settle for a deflationary account of freedom and declare victory, with some brief remarks reminding us that we were created a little lower than the angels. I am not so sanguine about the ability of such accounts to leave reasonably intact our judgments about human autonomy, dignity, and responsibility. But, as I've said, that's not my concern here. Instead, I want to revisit the question of what exactly 'self-determination', on our ordinary conception, comes to.
I will assume, for familiar reasons, that freedom of will requires that our actions be causally undetermined. 1 Recently, some philosophers have advanced sophisticated accounts that incorporate this condition of significant causal indeterminism, some of which are refinements of familiar views and some of which are novel. 2 Such views fall into three basic camps: agent causation accounts, simple indeterminism, and causal indeterminism. (Each of these positions will be explained below.) In an earlier article, 3 I argued that simple indeterminism and causal indeterminism are inadequate approaches, through an examination of the three best contemporary defenses of them, and concluded that incompatibilists must revive the traditional notion of agent causation, despite the well-known objections that have been raised to it. Subsequently, I have begun the task of refurbishing and defending this idea.
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But proponents of the alternative views have not been without their replies. (Alas, such unseemly displays of willful obstinance are common in philosophy.) So in the present paper, I want to explain as carefully as I can why the incompatibilist who does not take free will to be an outright incoherent idea 5 should believe in agent causationunfashionable though this may be.
II Agent Causation Briefly Explained
To be an agent causationist, you have to believe in a nonreductionist account of causation generally. 'Ordinary' causation by events or states of affairs may conform to sharp, generalizable patterns -and it may even fall out of one's account of such causation that there will be such patterns -but causation, for the nonreductionist, is not constituted by such patterns. The core notion of causal production (or in a more technical jargon, 'causal oomph') is the notion of an ontologically basic sort of relation.
But that a reductionist analysis of causation is not possible does not rule out all attempt at explication. Here, in broad strokes, is a nonreductionist explication of event causation of the sort that I favor. Ordinary objects possess a range of causal powers.
When placed in the appropriate circumstances (circumstances that either simply remove impediments to the action of an object already in a state of readiness to act or that stimulate a latent causal mechanism), they will exercise these causal capacities. These capacities have their basis in the object's underlying nature -its structural and dynamical properties. Such properties are thus 'two-sided' -they have both a categorical (e.g., being
sharp-edged) and a dispositional (e.g., bestowing a capacity to cut certain kinds of object) nature.
How should the notion of agent causation be understood by one who accepts this basic account of event causation? Let us first note that the notion of a particular freely and directly (i.e., agent-causally) bringing about an effect requires that the particular is an agent capable of representing possible courses of action to himself and having certain desires and beliefs concerning those alternatives. 6 What sort of events do agent causes bring about? As I will think of it, these agent-caused internal events are determinate (immediately executive) intentions to act in various ways. The agent-causal relation itself is conceived simply as follows: Wherever the agent-causal relation obtains, the agent bears a property or set of properties that is 'choice-enabling' (i.e., in virtue of such properties, the agent has a type of causal power which, following Reid, we may term "active power"). But this 'active power' -the causal power in virtue of which one has freedom of will -is not characterized by any function from circumstances to effects (as is the case with event causal powers). For the properties that confer such a capacity do not themselves (in the appropriate circumstances) necessitate or make probable a certain effect. Rather, they (in conjunction with appropriate circumstances) make possible the direct, purposive bringing about of an effect by the agent who bears them. Such properties thus play a different functional role in the associated causal process. Though the very same relation of causation is involved, these properties gives rise to a fundamentally different type of causal power -one that in suitable circumstances is exercised at will by the agent, rather than of necessity, as with objects that are not partly self-determining agents.
There is more to be said and asked about such an account of freedom of will (and we will ask some of those questions below), but it will have to suffice for now as a basic picture. It is clear enough why one might be initially attracted to it. For, on such an account, rather than my activity's being a product of external conditions that impinge on me in various ways, establishing internal states that in turn cause the behavior, I am quite literally the cause (source, point of origination) of my own behavior.
But appearances can be misleading. Some incompatibilists have recently urged that such an appeal to a primitive form of causation is either useless or positively incompatible with a basic feature of action that we have been silent about up to this point -viz., that actions are explainable by reasons the agent had in acting as he did. So let us now consider such arguments, and the alternative accounts of freedom of will they are said to bolster.
III Simple Indeterminism and Agent Causation
The most prominent contemporary defender of simple indeterminism is Carl Ginet.
So let us use his account as representative of the general view. The central feature of
Ginet's theory of action is the claim that there is a simple mental action (lacking internal causal structure) at the core of every causally-complex action. In the central sort of case, however, this simple action will be a volition that constitutes the core element of one's voluntarily exerting the body, causally producing that exertion (1990, pp.23ff.). The intentional content of the volition is that you are voluntarily exerting your body in a specific sort of way. This content, though, is directed to the immediate present (thereby differing from decision or intention), making it a "fluid" sort of mental activity over time (1990, p.32).
As a simple indeterminist, Ginet holds that such actions are free if the simple actions at their core are uncaused. One who does not favor Ginet's simple indeterminist view might pick up the argument at this point and insist that, however one wants to describe the agent-causal event itself ('an exercise of active power'), the agent causationist's own original line of reasoning suggests that one controls this event only to the extent that one causes it. So if it occurs uncaused, its occurrence is not something that was up to the agent, something he controlled. Surely this can consist only in E's causing F, the front-end relatum of the complex event.
10 When I reflect on the matter, I cannot but regard this as reflecting an evident, general truth about causation. If this is right, then an agent-causal event could not be caused for the simple reason that the cause in this case is not itself an event.
Ginet, however, argues that while the above may be a plausible claim for the way in which an event-causal event is caused, it is not obvious for the case of an agent-causal Should we also allow that there could be a direct cause of the relation between A and S's causing B, one that does not do so by causing A itself? Granted that this is now a case of an event's causing another event, but the second event is an instance of agent causation, so perhaps that makes it sufficiently special as to allow for the direct causation of a causal relation.
If my strategy has been successful, my reader will by now be inclined to agree that it is simply wrongheaded, in general, to countenance direct causings of causal relations. Let us now consider a second objection to agent causation that is made by simple indeterminists. We explain intentional actions in terms of reasons the individual had for so acting. According to several philosophers, this simple truism poses a difficulty for the theory of agent causation.
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In order to understand the different forms this charge takes, we must first set out a fragment of an account of reasons explanation of actions from the perspective of the theory of agent causation. Consider, then, the explanation of action by reference to a prior
desire. An agent causationist might give the following general conditions for the truth of such explanations:
S acteded then in order to satisfy her antecedent desire that Ø if:
(i) prior to the action, S had a desire that Ø and believed that by so acting she would satisfy (or contribute to satisfying) that desire, and
(ii) her action was initiated (in part) by her own self-determining causal activity, the event component of which is the-coming-to-be-of-an-action-triggeringintention-to-A-here-and-now, and (iii) concurrent with the action, S continued to desire that Ø and intended of the action that it satisfy (or contribute to satisfying) that desire, and (iv) S's concurrent intention was a direct causal consequence of the action-triggering intention brought about by the agent and it causally sustained the completion of her action.
Simple indeterminists have claimed that this explanation schema is inadequate in at least two different ways. Some claim that the second condition is perfectly idle, since the other conditions are perfectly sufficient to explain the action (thus vindicating the simple indeterminist's wholly noncausal account of reasons explanations). may have a reason for calling a friend on the phone, but no reason for calling at the precise moment I did. Let us focus on this second case. The agency theory maintains that, if I was free in making the phone call, then I caused the state of intention that issued in the bodily movements. But because I was not caused to so act just then and had no reasons for acting just then, there was nothing that explained the timing of my action.
And this, it is held, is problematic: how can a cause of an event's occurring at a certain time fail to explain its occurring at that time? This reveals, it is urged, that it is incoherent to appeal to the agent -simply qua agent, apart from particular features of him at the moment his causal power was exercised -as the cause of the state of intention's being formed.
I will consider these objections in turn. The first alleged that agent causation plays no real role in the explanation of the action. If one desired that Ø and intended througout the action that it satisfy that desire, then one has thereby acted for the purpose of satisfying that desire; no appeal to a special sort of action-starting event is necessary.
But if my earlier contention that the exercising of control in acting must have a causal structure, then this objection cannot be right. It is not sufficient to explain an action that one have had prior desires or intentions whose contents 'fit' the action performed; one must have controlled the performance of the action (for the very purpose of satisfying the desire or intention in question). The agent causationist need not hold that the only way in which exercising control for the purpose of satisfying a prior desire can be carried out involves agent causation. Agent causation is appealed to in order to explain freedom of action, not action simpliciter. ('Controlling' the course of one's activity is a weaker notion than acting with free will.) So while it is true, I think, that the agent-causal condition (ii) is not itself a necessary condition on acting in order to satisfy some desire, it is necessary that there be some causal condition or other that accounts for the agent's exercising control in acting as he does. Consequently, the agent-causal condition is not idle and simple indeterminism has not been vindicated.
Let me now turn to Ginet's argument (inspired by some well-known remarks of C.D. "But a feature of e is the time it occurred." True, and it is also true that I caused it to occur at that time.
"But what about the event, e's occurring at t rather than at t-1. Ex hypothesi, there is no explanation of this event, and yet you caused it, according to the agency theory." Here I think Ginet is mistaken to hold that there is any such event as e's occurring at t rather than at t-1, in addition to e itself. There is no reason to hold that corresponding to every contrastive fact about a contingent occurrence there is a distinct 'contrastive event'.
Defending this claim would take us into fundamental issues in ontology (in particular, the theory of universals). But we needn't discuss that here. For even if one goes in for contrastive events, one needn't hold that there is any agent-caused event that is completely unexplained. Consider a case of indeterministic event causation from quantum mechanics. 14 A photon is fired at a screen with two slits. If detected at slit A, it will cause a green light to go on, and if detected at B, it will cause a red light to go on.
Via an indeterministic process, it causes the red light to go on. Now if we say that in addition to the red light's going on, there is the event, the red light's going on rather than the green light's going on, then it would be natural to say that the firing of the photon caused the first of these, but not the second. It is likewise natural to say, in the case of agent causation, that the agent causes e but not e's occurring at t rather than at t-1. So the agent causationist needn't be committed to there being an event which has a cause and yet has no explanation.
A final objection to agent causation from the simple indeterminists is epistemological, rather than metaphysical, in nature. It is that agent causation is undetectable, and so we could never have any reason to posit it. Evidence of significant indeterminism at the level of human action would not favor the hypothesis of agent causation over that of causal randomness.
In reply, I would begin by observing that whatever force this objection has, it is had equally by a parallel objection to a nonreductionist account of event causation. On such an account, causal relations are among the basic furniture of the universe. And like Ginet on agent causation, a Humean reductionist about event causation will say that all we have direct evidence of is the pattern of relations among types of events. Having noted this parallel objection, there are two things to be said in response to both of them. The first is that we don't simply observe an apparently undetermined event (in the case of of an agent's activity) or a pair of events falling under a certain type of lawlike pattern (in the general case of event causation). Rather, we seem to directly observe their causal connectedness -at least in some cases. For example, I don't merely observe the movement of the hammer and then the movement of the nail -I perceive the hammer's moving the nail. And in the (putatively agent-causal) case of my own deliberate formation of intentions, the event doesn't seem merely to occur, but seems to be my directly exerting causal control in bringing it about. (Note Ginet's own frank admission of the 'actish phenomenal quality'.) Such apparent perception of causality could be mistaken, of course, but by the same token, so could our apparent perception of ordinary physical objects, and few would take that as a reason for disbelief.
The second thing to be said about the objection is that there are theoretical, as well as perceptual, reasons for accepting the existence of event causal relations in the actual case and agent causal relations in a hypothetical case involving evidence of significant (and apparently non-law-governed) indeterminism in the production of human behavior. For the alternative to positing causal relations of the appropriate sort is to accept such occurrences as brute, unexplained facts. In my book, this is an unreasonable stance.
I have now completed my discussion of arguments for favoring simple indeterminism to agent causation. Before I move on, though, I want to make one final point about the simple indeterminist view. The simple indeterminist holds that a free action must be causally undetermined and that there need not be any causation (of even an indeterministic variety) involved in the generation of such actions. But Ginet, for example, appears to allow that a given free action might be caused in an indeterministic fashion. My point is that the simple indeterminist cannot, in consistency, allow for this. 
IV Causal Indeterminism and Agent Causation
Causal indeterminism is an alternative to both agent causation and simple indeterminism as an account of free will. According to the causal indeterminist, our free decisions are caused, but nondeterministically. And the most salient of the causal conditions of those decisions are the states of having reasons for deciding in that manner.
In many circumstances, persons have (at least partially) distinct desire-belief complexes (more simply, "reasons") that point toward different courses of action, and the performance of any of these -not just the one that was actually done -would "graft" coherently onto precisely the same prior circumstance. Each such reason is a potential cause of the corresponding behavior; whichever action is (as it happens) undertaken will have been caused by the matching reason(s).
The basic motivation for this view is that it provides a way of recognizing (contra the simple indeterminist) that control over one's decision-making must be causal in nature, the efforts of will that precede them.
The basic structure of moral and prudential deliberations is held to be as follows:
(1) The agent is in a divided motivational state, feeling inclined to pursue each of two or more incompatible courses of action. The different motivations for each such action are incommensurate, reflecting different ends or purposes.
(2) Such conflicts result in an 'effort of will' -a struggle by the agent to get his ends or purposes sorted out (msp.198). In a context of moral decision-making, they are struggles to act in accordance with perceived obligation in the face of contrary motives to act differently, with the outcome being uncertain in the agent's mind prior to the moment of choice. It is supposed that an effort of will is an indeterminate process, analogous to the indeterminacy of position and momentum of an individual particle at the quantum level prior to a measurement. Kane suggests that this could be true of even complex processes in our brains involving many neuron firings and connections, provided that there be 'chaotic processes' -processes sensitive to minute changes in intial conditions -in the brain that could amplify indeterminate events at the micro-level. Persons experience these complex processes as efforts of will they are making to resist temptation in moral and prudential situations. (msp.200-2) (3) Resolution of the indeterminacy is achieved through the agent's choice, which, because of the indeterminacy of the process leading up to it, is a causally undetermined event.
Finally, we should note that, according to Kane, because their efforts are thus a response to inner conflicts embedded in the agents' prior character and motives ... their characters and motives can explain the conflicts and explain why the efforts are being made, without also explaining the outcomes of the conflicts and the efforts.
[They] provide reasons for going either way, but not decisive reasons explaining which way the agent will inevitably go.
(msp.198)
This thumbnail sketch of Kane's basic picture is enough for us to begin raising questions about it. As I do so, I will introduce further wrinkles that Kane adds to address many of these questions.
On Kane's account, then, a moral or prudential choice is an undetermined, causal outcome of an indeterminate struggle or effort to sort out one's purposes via deliberation.
One basic problem with this account, as I see it, concerns how this choice occurs.
Consider the simpler quantum analogue. An isolated particle (e.g., an electron) moves toward a thin atomic barrier. Its position and momentum are not both determinate; rather, it is in a superposition of states (instead of having a fully determinate position, its position is describable only by a particular range of values) such that there is a certain probability tht it will penetrate the barrier. But now, on the orthodox interpretation, the resolution of the indeterminacy is a consequence of a quantum mechanical measurement event. This, of course, raises puzzling questions of its own. However, my purpose is not to raise those questions, but instead to note the apparent need for a special kind of 'trigger' event to induce determinacy in the system. It's hard to see how Kane can accomodate this need within his picture of free choice. For if the choice which induces determinacy is disconnected from the indeterminate process itself, it will not admit of a causally indeterministic explanation in terms of that process's antecedents. This will either land us back into simple indeterminism, or push us to admitting a sui generis agent-causal activity, which causal indeterminism is supposed to enable us to avoid. But, returning to moral and prudential choice, perhaps its nature can be explicated in a way that leaves intact the basic causal indeterminist picture. There is still the fundamental question of how it is that I may be said to control it, whichever way it goes in a given case. How is it up to me that, on this occasion, this one among two or more causally possible choices was made?
Kane thinks that part of an answer to this can be given by positing a 'self network'. This is conceived as a comprehensive network of neural connections representing the agent's general motivational system -the plans, aspirations, and ideals in terms of which she defines herself as agent and practical reasoner (msp.217-18). (These diverse neural circuits could act in concert by forming a synchronized pattern of oscillations or wave activity of a sort that has been suggested in recent studies.) He suggests that the neural events corresponding to our efforts and choices would be overlaid by the wave patterns unifying the self network -so that the wave patterns and the effort or choice events are coupled, causally influencing and interacting with each other. The effort and choice events would occur, so to speak, 'within' the selfnetwork whose distinctive wave patterns were superimposed on them. In turn, the superimposed wave patterns of the self-network would be contributing causes to choice, pushing one competing reason-network over the top, so to speak, so that A is chosen for reasons R rather than B for reasons R' (or vice versa) -thus supporting the belief that the efforts and choices are our doings, the products of our selves. (msp.219)
So it is the influencing activity of the superimposed self-network that turns back the objection that I am unable to directly determine which outcome my reasons states will
give rise to in a given case. I do so determine this, because this self network essentially constitutes who I am, psychologically speaking. The self-network, then, is a kind of surrogate for traditional appeals to an irreducible causation by the agent, qua agent. But the fact that the causal activity of the self-network is decomposable into the activity of the various micro-physical events that compose it leads to a couple of further problems.
First, my self-network is itself a product of numerous previous decisions (as well as hereditary and environmental factors). So it is natural to assume that it can ground my responsibility for my present choice only if I can be shown to be responsible (at least in part) for its present constitution. And this seems to push us back, ultimately, to very early choices that were not influenced decisively by a self-network for the simple reason that it didn't exist, at leat in a significantly developed form. Kane might argue that the historical factors that gave rise to my present self-network are irrelevant to the question of its capacity to ground present choices. It simply constitutes who I now am, and if I qua selfnetwork can engage in self-creating activity by forming a free, undetermined choice (and hence a choice that is not determined by the factors that gave rise to the self-network), then I bear responsibility for that choice.
Instead of pursuing this line of objection further, however, I want to urge a second objection, one that focuses directly on the activity of the self-network. For it seems that precisely the problem it was supposed to solve in relation to the indeterministic activity of my reason states -my apparent inability to directly determine the outcome of the chancey, indeterministic events constituting my reason states -reappears in relation to it.
When we focus on the complexity of the states that constitute this network, and recognize that its causal propensity (to give rise to any of a range of choice outcomes) is a direct function of the total set of individual propensities of each micro-event to cause any of a range of other micro-events, it seems that which choice the network will indeterministically cause to be formed is not something that I directly control. And noting further that these propensities at the micro-level are governed by fundamental statistical laws seems to heighten the sense of difficulty.
However, I
have not yet exhausted all of Kane's moves on this score. He considers the objection that invites us to consider an imaginary scenario in which two persons have exactly the same past and engage in identical efforts of will, but one of them chooses prudently while the other does not. Doesn't it seem a matter of luck, the objection goes, that one of them overcame short-sighted temptation, while the other did not? To connect this to the way I have been formulating the problem, we could say that it seems that the deepest explanation of the different outcomes is in terms of the causal potentialities of the properties constituting the agents' (identical) states prior to their choices. If we had several such agents, a certain predictable proportion of them would choose one way, and the rest another. There is nothing more to be said.
To this, Kane replies that:
[w]ith indeterminate efforts exact sameness is not defined. Nor is exact difference 
V Conclusion
Progress in philosophical understanding does not always come by jettisoning seemingly baroque traditional accounts in favor of newfangled ones. Such is the case with the ancient conumdrum of free will. There is much work to be done in explicating
